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Abstract
The problem of assigning tasks to workers is of long-standing fundamental im-
portance. Examples of this include the classical problem of assigning computing
tasks to nodes in a distributed computing environment, assigning jobs to robots,
and crowdsourcing. Extensive research into this problem generally addresses im-
portant issues such as uncertainty and incentives. However, the problem of ad-
versarial tampering with the task assignment process has not received as much
attention.
We are concerned with a particular adversarial setting where an attacker may
target a set of workers in order to prevent the tasks assigned to these workers from
being completed. When all tasks are homogeneous, we provide an efficient al-
gorithm for computing the optimal assignment. When tasks are heterogeneous,
we show that the adversarial assignment problem is NP-Hard, and present an al-
gorithm for solving it approximately. Our theoretical results are accompanied by
extensive experiments showing the effectiveness of our algorithms.
1 Introduction
The problem of allocating a set of tasks among a collection of workers has been a
fundamental research question in a broad array of domains, including distributed com-
puting, robotics, and, recently, crowdsourcing [2, 25, 17]. Despite the extensive interest
in the problem, however, there is little prior work on task assignment in settings where
workers may be attacked. Such adversarial task assignment problems can arise, for
example, when tasks are of high economic or political consequence, such as in robotic
rescue missions following terror activities, or crowdsourcing to determine which exe-
cutables are malicious or benign, or which news stories constitute fake news.
We investigate the adversarial task assignment problem in which a rational external
attacker targets one or more workers after tasks have already been assigned. Equiva-
lently, this can be viewed as a robust task assignment problem with unknown uncer-
tainty about worker failures. We formalize the interaction between the attacker and
requester (defender) as a Stackelberg game in which the defender first chooses an as-
signment, and the attacker subsequently attacks a set of workers so as to maximize the
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defender’s losses from the attack. We seek a strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) of
this game and focus on computing an optimal robust assignment.
Our analysis begins with a setting in which tasks are homogeneous, that is, all
tasks have the same utility for the defender (e.g., rescue soldiers from a battlefield,
or label a large dataset of images). We characterize the optimal structure of a robust
assignment, and use this insight to develop an algorithm that extracts this assignment in
time linear in the number of tasks and targets, and quadratic in the number of workers.
We show that this algorithm significantly outperforms several baselines, and obtains a
good solution even when no adversary is present.
Next, we turn to heterogeneous task settings. This case, it turns out, is considerably
more challenging. Specifically, we show that it may be beneficial to assign more than
a single worker to a task. Moreover, even if we impose a restriction that only a single
worker can be assigned to a task (optimal when tasks are homogeneous), extracting
the optimal assignment is strongly NP-Hard. To overcome this issue, we propose an
integer programming approach for solving the restricted problem, as well as an algo-
rithm for finding an approximately optimal assignment in the general case. Again, our
experiments show that our approach significantly outperforms several baselines.
Related Work The problem of task assignment in adversarial settings has been con-
sidered from several perspectives. One major stream of literature is about robots acting
in adversarial environments. Alighanbari and How [1] consider assigning weapons
to targets, somewhat analogous to our problem, but do not model the decision of the
adversary; their model also has rather different semantics than ours. Robotic soccer is
another common adversarial planning problem, although the focus is typically on coor-
dination among multiple robots when two opposing teams are engaged in coordination
and planning [14].
Another major literature stream which considers adversarial issues is crowdsourc-
ing. One class of problems is a number of workers to hire [4], the issue of individual
worker incentives in truthfully responding to questions [22], or in the amount of effort
they devote to the task [27, 10, 17], rather than adversarial reasoning per se. Another,
more directly adversarial setting, considers situations where some workers simply an-
swer questions in an adversarial way [12, 24]. However, the primary interest in this
work is robust estimation when tasks are assigned randomly or exogenously, rather
than task assignment itself. Similarly, prior research on machine learning when a por-
tion of data is adversarially poisoned [5, 28, 11, 6, 18] focuses primarily on the robust
estimation problem, and not task assignment; in addition, it does not take advantage
of structure in the data acquisition process, where workers, rather than individual data
points, are attacked. Other works [13, 3] focus on the change of the system after the
assignment process and the structure of the social network rather than the assignment
process itself.
Our work has a strong connection to the literature on Stackelberg security games [8,
16, 26]. However, the mathematical structure of our problem is quite different. For ex-
ample, we have no protection resources to allocate, and instead, the defender’s decision
is about assigning tasks to potentially untrusted workers.
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2 Model
Consider an environment populated with a single requester (hereafter denoted by “de-
fender”), a set of n workers, W , a set of m tasks, T , and an adversary. Furthermore,
each worker w ∈ W is characterized by a capacity constraint cw, which is the maxi-
mum number of tasks it can be assigned, and an individual proficiency or the probabil-
ity of successfully completing a task, denoted by pw.Worker proficiencies are assumed
to be common knowledge to both the defender and attacker. Such proficiencies can
be learned from experience [21, 9, 19]; moreover, in many settings, these are provided
by the task assignment (e.g., crowdsourcing) platform, in the form of a reputation sys-
tem [20].
For exposition purposes, we index the workers by integers i in decreasing order of
their proficiency, so that P = (p1, . . . , pn) s.t. pi ≥ pj ∀i < j, and denote the set of
k most proficient workers byW k. Thus, the capacity of worker i would be denoted by
ci. Each task t ∈ T is associated with a utility ut that the defender obtains if this task is
completed successfully. If the task is not completed successfully, the defender obtains
zero utility from it.
We focus on the common case where the defender faces a budget constraint of
making at most B ≤ m assignments; the setting with B > m necessitates different al-
gorithmic techniques, and is left for future work. The defender’s fundamental decision
is the assignment of tasks to workers. Formally, an assignment s specifies a subset of
tasks T ′(s) and the set of workers,Wt(s) assigned to each task t ∈ T
′(s).
Suppose that multiple workers are assigned to a task t, and let Lt(s) denote the
labels returned by workers in Wt(s) for t (for example, these could simply indicate
whether a worker successfully complete the task). Then the defender determines the
final label to assign to t (e.g., whether or not the task has been successfully completed)
according to some deterministic mapping δ : Lt(s)→ l (e.g., majority label), such that
L ∈ {1, . . . , jt}
|Wt(s)| and l ∈ {1, . . . , jt}. Naturally, whenever a single worker w is a
assigned to a task and returns a label lw, δ(lw) = lw. Let ιt be the (unknown) correct
label corresponding to a task t; this could be an actual label, such as the actual object in
the image, or simply a constant 1 if we are only interested in successful completion of
the task. The defender’s expected utility when assigning a set of tasks T ′(s) to workers
and obtaining the labels is then
udef (s) =
∑
t∈T ′(s)
ut Pr{δ(Lt(s)) = ιt}, (1)
where the probability is with respect to worker proficiencies (and resulting stochastic
realizations of their outcomes).
It is immediate that in our setting if there is no adversary and no capacity constraints
for the workers, all tasks should be assigned to the worker with the highest pw. Our
focus, however, is how to optimally assign workers to tasks when there is an intelligent
adversary who may subsequently (to the assignment) attack a set of workers. In par-
ticular, we assume that there is an adversary (attacker) with the goal of minimizing the
defender’s utility udef ; thus, the game is zero-sum. To this end, the attacker chooses
a set of τ workers to attack, for example, by deploying a cyber attack against the cor-
responding computer nodes, physical attacks on search and rescue robots, or attacks
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against the devices on which the human workers performs their tasks. Alternatively,
our goal is to be robust to τ -worker failures (e.g., N -τ -robustness [7]). We encode
the attacker’s strategy by a vector α where αw = 1 iff a worker w is attacked (and∑
w αw = τ since τ workers are attacked). The adversary’s attack takes place after
the tasks have already been assigned to workers, where the attacker knows the actual
assignments of tasks to workers before deploying the attack, and the consequence of an
attack on a worker w is that all tasks assigned to w fail to be successfully completed.
Clearly, when an attacker is present, the policy of assigning all tasks to the most
competent worker (when there are no capacity constraints) will yield zero utility for
the defender, as the attacker will simply attack the worker to whom all the tasks are
assigned. The challenge of how to split the tasks up among workers, trading off quality
with robustness to attacks, is the subject of our inqury. Formally, we aim to compute a
strong Stackelberg equilibriumof the game between the defender (leader), who chooses
a task-to-worker assignment policy, and the attacker (follower), who attacks a single
worker [23].
3 Homogeneous tasks
We start by considering tasks which are homogeneous, that is, ut = ut′ for any two
tasks t, t′. Without loss of generality, suppose that all ut = 1. Note that since all tasks
share the same utility, if B < m, the defender is indifferent regarding the identity of
tasks being assigned. Further, it is immediate that we never wish to waste budget, since
assigning a worker always results in non-negative marginal utility. Consequently, we
can simply randomly subsample B tasks from the set of all tasks, and consider the
problem withm = B.
We overload the notation and use s = {s1, . . . , sn} to denote the number of tasks
allocated to each worker. Although the space of deterministic assignments is large,
we now observe several properties of optimal assignments which allow us to devise an
efficient algorithm for this problem.
Proposition 1. Suppose that tasks are homogeneous. For any assignment s there is a
weakly utility-improving assignment s′ for the defender which assigns each task to a
single worker.
Proof. Consider an assignment s and the corresponding best response by the attacker,
α, in which a worker w¯ is attacked. Let a task t¯ be assigned to a set of workers Wt¯
with |Wt¯| = k > 2. Then there must be another task t
′ which is unassigned. Now
consider a worker w ∈ Wt¯. Since utility is additive, we can consider just the marginal
utility of any worker w′ to the defender and attacker; denote this by uw′ . Let Tw′
be the set of tasks assigned to a worker w′ under s. Let uw =
∑
t∈Tw
uMwt, where
uMwt = ut Pr{δ(Lt(s)) = ιt} − ut Pr{δ(Lt(s) \ L
w
t ) = ιt} is the marginal utility of
worker of w towards a task t. Clearly, uw ≤ uw¯, since the attacker is playing a best
response.
Suppose that we reassign w from t¯ to t′. If w = w¯, the attacker will still attack w
(since the utility of w to the attacker can only increase), and the defender is indifferent.
If w 6= w¯, there are two cases: (a) the attacker still attacks w¯ after the change, and
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(b) the attacker now switches to attack w. Suppose the attacker still attacks w¯. The
defender’s net gain is pw − u
M
wt¯
≥ 0. If, instead, the attacker now attacks w, the
defender’s net gain is uw¯ − uw ≥ 0.
Consequently, we can restrict the set of assignments to those which assign a single
worker per task; we denote this restricted set of assignments by S. Given a assignment
s ∈ S and the attack strategy α, the defender’s expected utility is:
udef (s, α) =
∑
w∈W
swpw(1− αw) (2)
Next, we show that there is always an optimal assignment that assigns tasks to the k
most proficient workers, for some k.
Proposition 2. In an optimal assignment s, suppose that si > 0 for i > 1. Then there
must be an optimal assignment in which si−1 > 0.
Proof. Consider an optimal assignment s and the attacker’s best response α in which
W¯ is the set of workers being attacked. Now, consider moving 1 task from i to i − 1.
We denote the updated set of workers attacked (due to this change) as W¯ ′. Suppose that
i ∈ W¯ , that is, the worker i was initially attacked. If i−1 ∈ W¯ ′, there are two potions:
1) i ∈ W¯ ′ (i.e., i is still being attacked) and hence the net gain to the defender does not
change, and 2) i /∈ W¯ ′ and hence the net gain to the defender is pi(|Ti| − 1) ≥ 0. If
i − 1 /∈ W¯ ′, the net gain is pi−1 > 0. Suppose that i /∈ W¯ . If i − 1 is now attacked,
the net gain is pw(|Tw| − 1) ≥ 0 (where w ∈ W¯ and w /∈ W¯ ′). Otherwise (i.e.,
i− 1 /∈ W¯ ′), the net gain is pi−1 − pi ≥ 0.
We can now present an assignment algorithm for optimal assignment (Algorithm 1)
which has complexity O(n2mτ). The intuition behind the algorithm is to consider
each worker i as a potential target of an attack, and then compute the best assignment
subject to a constraint that i is attacked (i.e., that pisi ≥ pjsj for all other workers
j 6= i). Subject to this constraint, we consider all possible numbers of tasks that can be
assigned to i, and then assign as many tasks as possible to the other workers in order
of their proficiency (where the τ workers that contribute the most to the defender’s
utility are attacked). The only special case (Steps 7-10) is when assigning the last
worker. In this case, it may be beneficial to alternate the last two workers’ assignments
to result in a more beneficial overall assignment. Optimality follows from the fact that
we exhaustively search possible targets and allocation policies to these, and assign as
many tasks as possible to the most effective workers.
Next, we turn to show that Algorithm 1 computes an optimal SSE commitment
when tasks are homogeneous. For readability, we denote the worker associated with
the highest utility as wmax, i.e., swmaxpwmax ≥ swpw∀w ∈ W . We focus on the case
where at least one worker is not attacked as otherwise all possible assignments result
in udef = 0.
Proposition 3. Given an assignment s resulted from Algorithm 1, changing (i.e., de-
creasing or increasing) the number of tasks allocated to the worker with the highest
utility (wmax) is promised to result in the same of lower utility for the defender.
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Algorithm 1 Homogeneous assignment
input: The set of workersW , and their proficiencies P
return: The optimal policy s∗
1: umax ← 0
2: for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
3: for si ∈ {1, . . . , ci} do
4: Υi ← sipi,B ← m− si
5: for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ i do
6: sj ← min(
⌊
pi
pj
si
⌋
, B, cj), B ← B − sj
7: if j < n ∧B + 1 ≤ min(
⌊
pi
pj+1
si
⌋
− 1, cj+1) then
8: s′ ← s, s′j ← sj − 1
9: if udef (s, α) ≤ udef(s
′, α′) + pj+1 then
10: sj ← sj − 1, B ← B + 1
11: Υj ← sjpj
12: Sort Υ in ascending order
13: util←
∑n−τ
k=1 Υk
14: if util > umax then
15: umax ← util, s
∗ ← s
16: return s∗
Proof. Since Algorithm 1 iterates over all possible assignments for this worker (Step
3), if assigning less (or more) tasks was profitable, this updated assignment was resulted
by the algorithm.
Proposition 4. Given an assignment s and two (arbitrary) workers j and k, such that
pk < pj and αj = 0 (i.e., j is not attacked under s), the defender cannot move a task
from k to j without making j a target.
Proof. Assume in negation that j can be assigned with an additional task and that
j /∈ T still holds. On each iteration, Algorithm 1 assigns worker i with si tasks (Step
3), than each time the algorithm gets to Step 5, it assigns some other worker with the
maximal amount of tasks such that this worker do not contribute to the defender’s utility
more than i does. Specifically, this is also the case for j. Hence, by assigning j an
additional task it must become a target (i.e., j ∈ T ), contradicting the assumption.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 computes an optimal SSE commitment when tasks are homo-
geneous.
Proof. Assume in negation that there exists some assignment s′ 6= s and its corre-
sponding attack strategy, α′, such that udef (s
′, α′) > udef (s, α). Specifically, there
exist 16 different ways to make a single change in an assignment (as detailed below).
For each of these changes, we prove that such assignment is not possible or contra-
dicts the above assumption (i.e., do not improve the defender’s expected utility). For
readability of the proof, we denote wsi as worker i under assignment s.
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1. Move a task from a non-target to a non-target ws1 /∈ T , w
s′
1 /∈ T , w
s
2 /∈ T ,
ws
′
2 /∈ T : If p1 ≥ p2, this change can either leave the utility as is (if p1 = p2)
or decrease it (assign a task to a less proficient worker), hence contradicting the
assumption. Otherwise, if p1 < p2, according to Proposition 4, a more proficient
non-target cannot be assigned with additional task and remains non-target.
2. ws1 /∈ T , w
s′
1 /∈ T , w
s
2 /∈ T , w
s′
2 ∈ T : Moving a task from a non-target worker
to a less proficient non-target (i.e., if p1 ≥ p2) cannot make the less proficient
worker a target (ws
′
2 ∈ T is not possible in this case). Otherwise, if p1 < p2,
p2 will become the worker associated with the highest utility under s
′ following
this change. Still, if this assignment resulted in an higher utility for the defender,
this was the output of Algorithm 1. Since this is not the output, udef(s, α) ≥
udef (s
′, α), contradicting the assumption.
3. ws1 /∈ T , w
s′
1 /∈ T , w
s
2 ∈ T , w
s′
2 /∈ T : A worker that is currently being attacked
cannot be assigned with an additional task and not be attacked anymore.
4. ws1 /∈ T , w
s′
1 /∈ T , w
s
2 ∈ T , w
s′
2 ∈ T : Moving a task from a non-target worker to
a target will only reduce the utility of the defender, contradicting the assumption.
5. ws1 /∈ T , w
s′
1 ∈ T , w
s
2 /∈ T , w
s′
2 /∈ T : A non-target worker cannot give a task
and become a target.
6. ws1 /∈ T , w
s′
1 ∈ T , w
s
2 /∈ T , w
s′
2 ∈ T : A non-target worker cannot give a task
and become a target.
7. ws1 /∈ T , w
s′
1 ∈ T , w
s
2 ∈ T , w
s′
2 /∈ T : A non-target worker cannot give a task
and become a target.
8. ws1 /∈ T , w
s′
1 ∈ T , w
s
2 ∈ T , w
s′
2 ∈ T : A non-target worker cannot give a task
and become a target.
9. ws1 ∈ T , w
s′
1 /∈ T , w
s
2 /∈ T , w
s′
2 /∈ T : Since w2 assigned with an additional task
and still not attacked, it must be the least proficient assigned worker. Thus, the
new target (instead of w1) is some other worker that results in the highest utility
for the defender. According to Proposition 3, if this step was beneficial, it was
resulted by Algorithm 1 that considers each worker as wmax.
10. ws1 ∈ T ,w
s′
1 /∈ T ,w
s
2 /∈ T ,w
s′
2 ∈ T : If p2 ≥ p1 this change makew2 the worker
who contributes most. According to Proposition 3, if this step was beneficial, it
was resulted by Algorithm 1 that considers each worker as wmax. Otherwise, if
p1 > p2, s1 < s2. The gain from this switch is (s1 − 1)p1 − s2p2. This gain
will be positive only if s1p1 − p1 > s2p2. Still, this is only possible if w2 is
the least proficient worker assigned (the difference of any other worker k from
being a target is at most pk). If this is the least proficient assigned worker and
becomes the target, it implies that w2 was assigned with the maximal amount of
tasks such that it is not a target under s. Hence, s2p2 > s1p1− p1, contradicting
the assumption.
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11. ws1 ∈ T , w
s′
1 /∈ T , w
s
2 ∈ T , w
s′
2 /∈ T : A worker that is currently being attacked
cannot be assigned with an additional task and not be attacked anymore.
12. ws1 ∈ T , w
s′
1 /∈ T , w
s
2 ∈ T , w
s′
2 ∈ T : Since w1 is no longer a target (and w2 was
initially a target), there exists some other worker w′ that prior to the change was
not a target but becomes one due to the change (i.e, currently contributes more
than ws
′
1 ). Hence, the defender’s utility decreases due to this change, contradict-
ing the assumption.
13. ws1 ∈ T , w
s′
1 ∈ T , w
s
2 /∈ T , w
s′
2 /∈ T : Assigning another task to a non-target
and keeping it a non-target is only possible if w2 is the least proficient worker
assigned (otherwise, this worker will become a target). Still, the difference be-
tween the utility resulted from each assigned worker k (beside maybe the least
proficient worker) and the worker who contributes the most, wmax, is at most
pk. By reducing the number of tasks assigned to w1, its difference from w
max
becomes more than pk for some worker k ∈ W . Hence, there is no way that w1
is assigned with one less task and still a target.
14. ws1 ∈ T , w
s′
1 ∈ T , w
s
2 /∈ T , w
s′
2 ∈ T : w2 becomes a target instead of some
other worker. There are two possible cases: 1) w2 is the least proficient worker
assigned. Note that the difference between the utility resulted from each as-
signed worker k (beside maybe the least proficient worker) and the worker who
contributes the most, wmax, is at most pk. By reducing the number of tasks as-
signed to w1, its difference from w
max becomes more than pk for some worker
k ∈ W . Hence, there is no way that w1 is assigned with one less task and
still a target. 2) w2 is some other worker. This means, that p2 = w
max (under
the new assignment). Still, if this assignment resulted in an higher utility for
the defender, this was the output of Algorithm 1. Since this is not the output,
udef (s, α) ≥ udef (s
′, α), contradicting the assumption.
15. ws1 ∈ T , w
s′
1 ∈ T , w
s
2 ∈ T , w
s′
2 /∈ T : A worker that is currently being attacked
cannot be assigned with an additional task and not be attacked anymore.
16. ws1 ∈ T , w
s′
1 ∈ T , w
s
2 ∈ T , w
s′
2 ∈ T : Since both workers remain targets,
udef (s, α) = udef (s
′, α′), contradicting the assumption.
Finally, since no single change is shown to be profitable from the defender’s point of
view, and any possible change in assignments can be represented as a set of single
changes, we conclude that Algorithm 1 computes an optimal SSE commitment when
tasks are homogeneous.
4 Heterogeneous tasks
It turns out that the more general problem in which utilities are heterogeneous is con-
siderably more challenging than the case of homogeneous allocation. First, we show
that even if the tasks’ utilities are slightly different, it may be beneficial to assign the
same task to multiple workers. Consider the case of an environment populated with
8
2 workers and 2 tasks. WLOG, we order the tasks by their utility, i.e., ut1 > ut2 .
Regardless of the workers’ proficiencies, assigning one worker per task will result in
an expected utility ofmin(piut1 , pjut2). On the other hand, assigning both workers to
t1 will result in an expected utility ofmin(piut1 , pjut1) which is always higher. Aside
from the considerably greater complexity challenge associated with solving problems
with heterogeneous utilities suggested by this example, there is the additional challenge
of incorporating (non-linear) decision rules into the optimization problem to resolving
disagreement among workers, should it arise.
We begin by showing that if B ≤ m, there is an optimal assignment in which only
the B tasks associated with the highest utility are included.
Proposition 5. Suppose that tasks are heterogeneous. For any assignment s there is
a weakly utility-improving (i.e., results in the same or higher utility) assignment s′ for
the defender which only assigns tasks from the set of tasks with the B highest utilities.
Proof. For readability, we assume that tasks are ordered based on their utility in de-
creasing order (i.e., ui ≥ uj, ∀i ≤ j), and that a single worker is assigned per task;
generalization is straightforward. Consider an assignment s and the corresponding best
response by the attacker, α, in which the set of workers W¯ is attacked. Let a task ti be
s.t. i > B. Then there must be another task tj , s.t. j ≤ B, which is unassigned. Now
consider a worker w ∈ Wti . Since utility is additive, we can consider just the marginal
utility of any worker w′ to the defender and attacker; denote this by uw′ . Let Tw′ be
the set of tasks assigned to a worker w′ under s. Let uw =
∑
t∈Tw
uMwt, where u
M
wt is
the marginal utility of worker of w towards a task t.
Suppose that we reassign w from ti to tj . If w ∈ W¯ , the attacker will still attack w
(since the utility of w to the attacker can only increase), and the defender is indifferent.
If w /∈ w¯, there are two cases: (a) the attacker still attacks W¯ after the change, and
(b) the attacker now switches to attack w. Suppose the attacker still attacks W¯ . The
defender’s net gain is pwuj − u
M
wt¯
≥ 0. If, instead, the attacker now attacks w, the
defender’s net gain is uw′ − uw ≥ 0. Where w
′ is the worker that is not being attacked
anymore.
This allows us to restrict attention to the B highest-utility tasks, and assume that
m = B.
We now show that the defender’s assignment problem, denoted Heterogeneous
tasks assignment (HTA), is NP-hard even if we restrict the strategies to assign only
a single worker per task.
Proposition 6. HTA is strongly NP-hard even when we assign only one worker per
task.
Proof. We prove the proposition by reducing the decision version of the Bin packing
problem (BP), which is a strongly NP-complete problem, to the decision version of
the HTA problem. In the BP problem we are given a set {o1, o2, ..., om} ofm objects
of sizes {v1, v2, ..., vm} and a set of n containers {C1, C2, ..., Cn}, each of size γ,
and we need to decide if all the objects can be fitted into the given containers. Our
transformation maps the set ofm objects to a set ofm+1 tasks T = {t1, t2, ..., tm+1}
with utilities {v1, v2, ..., vm, γ} and the set of n containers to a set of n + 1 workers
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W = {w1, w2, ..., wn+1}. We consider the private case where all the workers have the
same proficiency p (i.e. pw = p, ∀w ∈ W ). The decision version of the HTA problem
asks if there exists an assignment of them+1 tasks to the n+1 workers that achieves
a utility of at least pV , where V =
∑m
i=1 vi.
If we started with a YES instance of the BP problem, then there exists an assign-
mentA that fits allm objects into the n containers. Consider the following assignment
of tasks to workers in the HTA problem. If A(oi) = Cj , we assign task ti to worker
wj . Also, we assign task tm+1 (with utility γ) to worker wn+1. Note that no worker
can achieve an individual utility greater than pγ, which is achieved by worker wn+1.
Thus, the utility of the overall task assignment is
∑m
i=1 pvi + pγ − pγ = pV , meaning
that our transformation produced a YES instance of the HTA problem.
Now suppose that we ended up with a YES instance of the HTA problem. Then
there exists a task assignmentB such that the sum of utilities (V ∗) minus the adversarial
harm (γ∗) is at least pV (i.e. V ∗ − γ∗ ≥ pV ). Note that V ∗ =
∑
i = 1mpvi + pγ =
pV +pγ (each task is assigned to some worker). This implies pV +pγ−γ∗ ≥ pV and
γ∗/p ≤ γ. Thus the utility sum (before performance p is applied) of the tasks assigned
to any single worker cannot exceed γ. This could only happen if task tm+1 (with utility
γ) was the only task assigned to the corresponding player. WLOG let that worker be
wn+1. All other tasks must have been assigned to workers {w1, w2, ..., wn}. It is easy
to see that this implies a feasible assignment of objects to containers in the BP problem
- if B(tj) = wi, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, then we place object oj in container Ci. Thus the
transformation must have started off with a YES instance of the BP problem.
We now propose an algorithm which computes an approximately optimal assign-
ment. We begin by supposing that only one worker can be assigned per task (we relax
this shortly). In this case, the optimal attack can be computed using the following linear
integer program:
max
α
∑
w∈W
αw
∑
t∈T
swtutpw (3a)
s.t. :
∑
w∈W
αw = τ (3b)
αw ∈ {0, 1}. (3c)
The objective (3a) aims to maximize the effect of the attack (i.e., the utility of the
targets). Constraint (3b) ensures that the adversary attacks exactly τ workers. First,
note that the extreme points of the constraint set are integral, which means we can
relax the integrality constraint to αw ∈ [0, 1]. In order to plug this optimization into
the defender’s optimal assignment problem, we convert this relaxed program to its dual
form:
min
λ,β
λτ +
∑
w
βw (4a)
s.t. : λ+ βw ≥ pw
∑
t∈T
swtut ∀ w (4b)
β ≥ 0. (4c)
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Thus, the optimal assignment can be computed using the following linear integer pro-
gram:
max
s,γ,λ,β
∑
w∈W
pw
∑
t∈T
swtut − γ (5a)
s.t. : γ ≥ λτ +
∑
w
βw (5b)
λ+ βw ≥
∑
t∈T
swtutpw, ∀w ∈ W (5c)
∑
w∈W
∑
t∈T
swt = m (5d)
∑
w
swt = 1, ∀t ∈ T (5e)
∑
t
swt ≤ cw, ∀w ∈W (5f)
swt ∈ {0, 1}. (5g)
The objective (5a) aims to maximize the defender’s expected utility given the adver-
sary’s attack (second term). Constraint (5b and 5c) validates that the adversary’s tar-
gets are the workers who contribute the most to the defender’s expected utility and
Constraint (5d) ensures that each allocation assigns all the possible tasks among the
different workers. Finally, Constraint (5e) ensures that only one worker is assigned for
each task and Constraint (5f) ensures that no worker is assigned with more tasks than
it can perform.
Next, we propose a greedy algorithm that attempts to incrementally improve utility
by shifting workers among tasks, now allowing multiple workers to be assigned to a
task. Whenever more than one worker is assigned to a given task, the defender has to
choose a deterministic mapping δ to determine the outcome. We consider a very broad
class of weighted majority functions for this purpose (natural if successful completion
of a task means that the worker returned the correct label). In this mapping, each
worker w is assigned a weight θw, and the final label is set according to the weighted
majority rule, i.e., δ(Lt) = sgn(
∑
w∈Wt(s)
θwlw).
In order to approximate the defender’s expected utility, we use the sample aver-
age approximation (SAA) [15] for solving stochastic optimization problems by using
Monte-Carlo simulation. Using this approach, the defender’s utility can be approxi-
mated by:
udef(CK ,W
′) =
∑
t∈T
ut
(
K∑
k=1
I{sgn
∑
w∈W ′ swtθwCwtk}
K
)
(6)
where CK is a set ofK matrices, each of size n overm. Each cell Cwtk is a randomly
sample based on pw represents whether or not the worker w successfully completed
the task. That is, Cwtk = 1 if worker w successfully completed task t, and Cwtk = 0
otherwise. In a similar manner, swt = 1 if worker w is assigned to task t, and swt = 0
otherwise.
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Algorithm 2 formally describes the computation of this assignment. Given an op-
timal assignment extracted using the mixed-integer linear program in Equation (5), we
iteratively alternate over all tasks in ascending order based on their utility. For each
task, we reassign the worker associated with this task to the most beneficial task. If this
reassignment improves the defender’s utility, we label it as beneficial (Steps 9 and 10).
Finally, we commit to the reassignment that will maximize the defender’s utility (Step
12).
Algorithm 2 Heterogeneous assignment
input: The set of workersW , and their proficiencies P
return: The heuristic deterministic allocation
1: Extract the optimal 1-worker allocation using Equation 5
2: util← udef(CK , α)
3: for t ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
4: for w ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
5: t = t
6: if swt = 1 then
7: for t′ ∈ {m, . . . , t+ 1} do
8: swt′ = 1, swt = 0, Update α
9: if udef (CK , α) > util then
10: t = t′, util← udef(CK , α)
11: swt′ = 0, swt = 1
12: swt = 0, swt = 1
13: return s
5 Experiments
We now experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approaches.
Workers’ proficiencies are sampled using two distributions: a uniform distribution over
the [0.5, 1] interval and an exponential distribution with µ = 0.25 where proficiencies
are truncated to be in this interval for the latter. We compare our adversarial assignment
algorithms to three natural baselines: Split-k and two versions ofMonte-Carlo (involv-
ing random assignment of tasks to workers). Specifically, for the Split-k method, we
divide tasks equally among the top k workers.1 For the Monte-Carlo approach, we con-
sider a simple variant which randomly distributes tasks among all the workers, denoted
by Monte-Carlo, and a variant of this which randomly distributes the tasks among the
top ⌈n2 ⌉ workers, denoted by Top Monte-Carlo. In both cases, the assigned worker for
each task is picked uniformly at random.
Homogeneous Tasks We begin by considering homogeneous tasks. For each exper-
iment, we take an average of 5,000 sample runs.
1The remainder is assigned in an iterative way from the least proficient worker to the most proficient one.
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Figure 1 presents the results comparing our algorithm to baselines for 50 work-
ers and tasks. As the figure shows, our algorithm outperforms the baselines, and the
gap becomes particularly pronounced as the number of targets increases. Moreover,
there doesn’t appear to be a qualitative difference between uniform and exponential
distribution in this regard.
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Figure 1: Homogeneous tasks: comparison to baseline methods.
It is natural that we must trade off robustness with performance of robust algorithms
in non-adversarial settings. We therefore conclude the homogeneous analysis by an-
alyzing the loss incurred by allowing for robustness, compared to a solution which is
optimal in non-adversarial settings. We vary the number of workers from 2 to 50, and
fix the number of tasks at 100 and the number of targets optimized against at t = 1.
Workers 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Exp. loss 24.9% 17.4% 15.27% 13.2% 11.6% 8.6% 5.8% 5.8% 6.5% 4.6%
Table 1: Expected loss of using adversarial assignment in non-adversarial settings.
Table 1 shows the expected loss of using adversarial task assignment in a non-
adversarial settings. With only 5 workers, we pay a steep price (just under 25%), but as
the number of workers increases, the loss shrinks; with 50 workers, we only lose 4.6%
compared to optimal non-robust assignment.
Heterogeneous Tasks We used CPLEX version 12.51 to solve the integer linear pro-
gram above.
First, we analyze how the heterogeneous assignment given in mixed-integer linear
program (MILP) (5) performs compared to the baselines when task utilities are sam-
pled from U [0, 1] and worker proficiencies are samples from U [0.5, 1]. We use similar
baseline methods to the ones used in studying homogeneous task assignment.
Figure 2 depicts the expected utility for the defender when using each of the meth-
ods in an environment populated with 15 tasks and 10 workers where the number of
targets the adversary attacks varies between 1 and 5 over 3, 000 runs. As is evidence
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Figure 2: Heterogeneous tasks: comparison to baseline methods.
from the figure, even the baseline mixed-integer linear program (which assumes a sin-
gle worker is assigned per task) significantly outperforms the baselines, with the dif-
ference growing as we increase the number of workers attacked.
Workers
Dist. Tasks 2 3 4 5 6
U[0,1] 3 57.08% 37.10%
U[0,1] 4 26.47% 9.88% 9.17%
U[0,1] 5 22.03% 3.83% 3.39% 3.46%
U[0,1] 6 19.98% 2% 1.79% 1.93% 1.66%
U[0,100] 3 56.9% 37.92%
U[0,100] 4 28.69% 9.59% 8.86%
U[0,100] 5 20.02% 3.59% 3.51% 3.49%
U[0,100] 6 17.41% 1.59% 1.71% 1.64% 1.77%
Table 2: Average improvement using Algorithm 2; τ = 1.
Next, we evaluate how much more we gain by using Algorithm 2 after computing
an initial assignment using MILP (5). In these experimets we use a natural weighted
majority decision rule with θw = pw (i.e., workers’ proficiencies), and set K = 2500.
We consider two uniform distributions for this study: U [0, 1] and U [0, 100]. Each
marginal improvement is averaged over 3,000 runs.
The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. We can see that there are cases where
assigning multiple workers per task can offer a significant benefit. However, as the
problem size increases, this benefit significantly attenuates, and it may suffice to just
rely on the assignment obtained from the MILP.
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Workers
Dist. Tasks 3 4 5 6
U[0,1] 3 1115.41%
U[0,1] 4 46.27% 49.75%
U[0,1] 5 19.52% 16.01% 21.68%
U[0,1] 6 9.88% 7.49% 10.9% 12.18%
U[0,100] 3 1130.13%
U[0,100] 4 58.23% 64.45%
U[0,100] 5 17.97% 14.62% 21.21%
U[0,100] 6 8.62% 7.05% 9.83% 11.51%
Table 3: Average improvement using Algorithm 2; τ = 2.
6 Conclusion
We consider the problem of assigning tasks to workers when workers can be attacked,
and their ability to successfully complete assigned tasks compromised. We show that
the optimal assignment problem (in the sense of Stackelberg equilibrium commitment),
when the attack takes place after the tasks have been assigned to workers, can be found
in pseudo-polynomial time. Furthermore, when tasks are heterogeneous, we show that
the problem is more challenging, as it could be optimal to assign multiple workers
to the same task. Even if we constrain the assignment such that only one worker is
assigned per task, extracting the optimal assignment becomes strongly NP-Hard (we
exhibit an integer linear program for the latter problem). Finally, we provide with an
algorithm of converting this constraint assignment to one that allows multiple workers
per task (and hence approximate optimal allocation).
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